As recent events have thrown the concept of gender into contemporary debate, lines have been firmly drawn between those who equate it with biological sex, and those who maintain that the two are distinct, albeit related, phenomena. The debate tends to centre on the recognition of transgender individuals. Specifically, whether they should be affirmed in the gender they identify with or confined to one that is argued to align with their sex as assigned at birth. The stakes here are considerable. Although this reflection does not attempt to speak on behalf of those whose lived experience is one that I do not share. Rather, I aim to clarify and develop my own position, which I formed with the intention of defending an individual’s right to choose their gender expression against claims to the contrary.

I am aware that the following discussion may seem simple and devoid of depth or insight in light of the vast philosophical works published on the topic – in the same way an undergraduate’s essay may seem to a professor with decades of wisdom in the field. I mean simply to express and refine my thoughts after reading some works in this area – including those by Judith Butler. I also aim to make some of these ideas more accessible to a non-academic audience so that these concepts are more widely understood.

I originally understood gender to be a social epiphenomenon of biological sex. By this, I mean that gender is a type of cultural offshoot, a conduit by which biological sex is interpreted and, most importantly, expressed socially. Although distinct from sex, gender is ultimately caused by it, the same way a shadow is cast by an object in the light. 

I adopted this position during my time writing my PhD and doing background research. I found myself frustrated with the frequent conflation of terms like “male” and “man” both in academia and mainstream discourse. So, I opted to use terms like “victimised men” instead of “male victims”, which suggested that I saw there was a difference between sex and gender, even if I hadn’t reflected on what philosophical foundations such a distinction would rest on. 

Essentially, however, this view assumes that while sex is a biological fact, gender is a set of social norms and conventions that stem from this facticity in the form of cultural expressions of these material differences. To anyone who disagreed, I would merely ask “where in our biology does it say that one group can wear flowery dresses, and the other should not – unless it’s done for comedy?”. As Hume reminds us, biology can tell us what is, but not what should be in any normative sense. Norms of behaviour, clothing, and even emotional expression are not dictated by chromosomes or hormone levels. Rather, gender seemed to me to be a cultural system of expectations with only a unidirectional causal relation to biological sex. 

Biological Essentialism/Determinism 

My epiphenomenal view stands in contrast to biological essentialism (or its more extreme version biological determinism). This is the idea that gender is a direct product of innate biological characteristics. For the sake of simplicity, I shall combine these views into a single argument termed ‘essentialism’. This differs from my original view that gender is the social expression of biological sex (and is thus a social construct), as essentialists argue that femininity and masculinity are natural expressions of biological sex, and not socially constructed categories. However, this view struggles to explain how gender specific norms, from fashion choices to emotional expression, vary so widely across time and between cultures. 

If gender was naturally (that is, biologically) determined, such variation would not exist. Consider that pink was once considered a masculine colour, and that men wore wigs and makeup in pre-revolutionary France. These brief examples illustrate that gender expression is not determined biologically but shaped by cultural interpretation. Essentialists may counter that femininity and masculinity are biologically rooted dispositions that are expressed differently in different cultures and across different historical periods. However, this concedes that culture plays some role in shaping how these dispositions are understood. This concession implies that gender is at least partially socially constructed. 

The “Attack Helicopter” Argument 

Before addressing more serious critiques, it is worth addressing a common bad-faith objection to the notion of gender as a socially constructed phenomenon. Some ‘critics’ argue that if gender is socially constructed then one can construct their own gender identity, suggesting that one can identify as anything at all. However, this misunderstands the nature of cultural meaning. One cannot choose a gender identity in a vacuum – they cannot be plucked from thin air. Rather, they emerge from, and depend upon, a shared cultural vocabulary. Culture provides us with a range of meaningful options to choose; we may choose one, combine some, or reject them outright – but we cannot create new gender identities on our own. The fact that no shared cultural meaning exists for “attack helicopter” as a gender expression allows us to dismiss this objection with the same amount of consideration that went into constructing it. 

Serious Philosophical Challenges 

Curiously, the strongest critiques of my initial position come from other social constructivists, such as Judith Butler. Two serious challenges arise. 

Firstly, this position assumes a causal relationship in which sex produces gender. Butler, however, argues that this confuses how these phenomena are related. Rather, she argues that gender constitutes our understanding of biological sex, rather than being a passive reflection of it. In this way, our collective understanding of what biological sex is, is shaped by gender norms. She would object to my initial view where sex causes gender by arguing this overlooks the recursive, or interactive, nature of their relationship. 

Secondly, I had treated biological sex as a clear and objective category, like age or height. This assumption, however, falls apart at the first hurdle of scrutiny. On what biological feature can we hang the label of ‘sex’ on? Genitalia, chromosomes, hormones, secondary sexual characteristics, and brain structure, all show considerable variation across individuals. Too much variation to allow for a simple dichotomous category, and even the demarcation between ‘male’ and ‘female’ must be arbitrarily determined. As such, we cannot consistently or definitively assign someone as ‘male’ or ‘female’ in every single case. The existence of intersex people neatly illustrates this issue. It now becomes clear that, like gender, biological sex is interpreted socially. 

A More Nuanced View 

The seriousness of these challenges have prompted me to revise my position. I now longer see sex and gender as separate, albeit causally related, phenomena. Instead, I envisage them as entwined through a recursive, interactive process of social interpretation and application. In this way, culture participates in shaping how biological sex is recognised labelled, and made meaning, rather than acting as its mere adornment. Thus, our understanding of sex itself is enmeshed with gendered expectations. 

This revised view permits me the rejection of essentialism while accepting and agreeing that bodies matter. It also provides an account of gender that both aligns with my initial view of gender as an expression, but shows how integral gender is to identity. In other words, gender is not just an expression of biological sex, it shines a light of understanding that gives meaning to biological sex. 

Refining the Relation Between Sex and Gender 

I now revise my position thus: 

Sex and gender are both multidimensional spectra – entwined but also conceptually and analytically distinct phenomena. Each is understood through socio-cultural frameworks where biological sex informs gender, and gender gives meaning to biological sex. 

Sex refers to a constellation of physical traits (e.g., chromosomes, hormones, anatomy etc.) which may not always align with each other. In other words, a person’s physical characteristics may not always align in the same position on a male-female continuum. Gender has been recast from being a passive social byproduct of sex to a constructed interpretation of these physical traits, an interpretive phenomenon shaped by social meanings, language, and related norms. I no longer understand the relationship between sex and gender as unidirectional, instead gender is what gives biological sex its social significance. Given this, the conflation between terms such as “male” and “man” become more understandable. Although they refer to different phenomena, their close cultural association can be reflected in such conflation. I understand that this account parallels what may be termed the ‘interpretive overlay model’, however I not sufficiently familiar with this work to draw comparisons. 

Besides illuminating linguistic quirks, this account accommodates cultural variability in gender roles and refutes the idea that these roles are biological expressions. While it partially agrees with the essentialists by showing that gender is closely related to sex, I argue that it is not reducible to it. I reject the idea that sex is some stable dichotomous category instead validating the existence of intersex and transgender individuals, whose existence also highlights the disconnect between assigned sex at birth and gender identity. Sex assignment is not a purely objective act as some might claim. Evidence to the contrary neatly illustrates that it is an act anchored in social tradition and interpretation. 

Addressing Objections 

Several objections are worth addressing. 

Firstly, biological determinists argue that biology alone dictates gender roles. However, we have shown that biology influences gender without having to concede that it is determined by it. We have already shown that gender roles vary widely across culture and time, which would not be the case if gender was purely biological. 

Secondly, there is an oft-cited argument that gender reflects some sort of reproductive embodiment. That womanhood, specifically, must reflect reproductive capacity with examples such as menstruation or the ability to conceive as definitive characteristics of their lived experience. While embodiment matters, how and why it matters is socially determined. Further, not all women share the same reproductive capacity, with post-menopausal women being a clear example, not to mention the myriad other reasons a woman may not be able to conceive. Reproductive capability cannot serve as a universal basis for gender identity. 

Another objection appeals to the apparent naturalness or necessity of a dichotomous category for both sex and gender in maintaining social cohesion. Proponents of this view maintain that order and clarity is achieved by this clean distinction in the face of chaos and uncertainty. They may point to this very debate as an example of this. However, this view commits the sin of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ – assuming that whatever is natural is somehow inherently good or necessary. Furthermore, even if certain traits cluster in binary patterns, it does not follow that all human persons neatly align with such an enforced binary system. Social cohesion is not best achieved by marginalising and invalidating the existence of non-binary or trans individuals. 

Some poststructuralists may challenge the distinction between sex and gender altogether by insisting that both are socially constructed. They may critique my treatment of biological sex as rooted in physical characteristics, suggesting that these characteristics are only meaningful because of social interpretation. However, my revised view acknowledges that although sex is materially grounded, it is still interpreted through social and cultural lenses. As such, biological categories such as those constituting sex, are shaped by the frameworks in which we understand them. 

Lastly, one may argue that this view is too complex to be of any assistance in developing law or policy. That it fails to cleanly or simply address issues around gender identification. I disagree. Complexity is not unfamiliar in these arenas. Indeed, categories such as disability or age already require nuanced interpretation. Nuance often improves equity by including more diversity, rather than forcing people into overly simplistic classifications. 

Concluding Remarks 

This reflection has illustrated some refinement in my thinking on the relation between gender and sex. I now understand that both sex and gender exist on interrelated albeit distinct spectra, which are shaped by both biological and social factors. While biological sex informs gender, neither completely determines the other in a simple or fixed way. Gender exists as a socially influenced interpretation of sex embodiment. 

This position avoids essentialism while recognised the material facticity of bodies. It provides some understanding that acknowledges the complexity if this issue without descending into relativism. It explains why gender norms and expectations change between time and cultures, and why sex itself is a biological and cultural concept. Essentialist accounts fail to explain this observed variability. This view provides a more nuanced and inclusive understanding of the dynamic interplay between sex and gender. This view both affirms material facticity and the immense power of social interpretation.